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Steve Klein & Andrea Barton Reeves
A Note on the Format
The Wagner Competition Fact Pattern contains one fictitious
arbitration decision and three fictitious federal court opinions. Citations
in the opinions follow formatting specifications for Court Documents
and Legal Memoranda in The Bluebook, 16th ed.
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THE AMERICAN UNION OF COLLEGE PROFESSORS,
LOCAL 522 v. PUERTA PACIFIC COLLEGE
Decided by Arbitrator Isaac Washington
March 14, 1996
SUMMARY OF DECISION: The American Union of College Professors
(the "Union" or "AUCP") brings this action on behalf of Julie McCoy,
who was terminated by her employer, Puerta Pacific College (the
"College"). The Union alleges that the College's salary structure ("Profit
Plan" or "Plan") violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994), because it has a disparate impact on
older professors. The union and the employer have been unable to
resolve this statutory-rights issue through the grievance process outlined
in the collective bargaining agreement, and each has agreed to resolve
this issue by arbitration. Article forty-seven of the collective bargaining
agreement allows statutory disputes to be brought to arbitration. No
other issues are before me for decision. I find that the ADEA does not
recognize disparate impact claims. I therefore deny Ms. McCoy's
demand for backpay and reinstatement.
ISSUES PRESENTED: Does the Profit Plan have a disparate impact on
older professors, and thus violate the ADEA? If so, what shall the
remedy be?
WA GNER FACT PA TTERN
FACTUAL BA CKGROUND
Julie McCoy, forty-seven, is a twenty-year law enforcement
veteran. After graduating from Wagner State College in 1974, Ms.
McCoy began as a rookie in the Wagner City Police Department. Ms.
McCoy demonstrated an unusual talent for police work, and she quickly
rose through the ranks to become a sergeant in 1982. As a sergeant, Ms.
McCoy supervised three officers and carried a full case-load of her own.
Ms. McCoy also taught courses at the Wagner Police Academy on basic
crime fighting skills, collecting evidence, and testifying in court, but her
real love and specialty was forensics. In 1987, Ms. McCoy became a
certified forensics expert and taught courses in crime-scene analysis and
evidence processing at the State Trooper Academy and other police
departments around the state.
After several years of varied duties, Ms. McCoy was anxious to
find a less stressful job, particularly one that allowed:her to use her
extensive law-enforcement background and relieved her of her
supervisory responsibilities. Throughout her career with the police
department, Ms. McCoy turned down offers of employment as a full-
time professor from several colleges throughout the country. One school
in particular, Puerta Pacific College, a private institution in the State of
Wagner, invited Ms. McCoy to speak as a guest lecturer at its School of
Criminal Justice.' Ms. McCoy developed a strong professional
relationship with Sylvia Spelling, the President of the College,. and
began to think about teaching at the College. President Spelling,
impressed with Ms. McCoy's educational background and extensive
experience, encouraged Ms. McCoy to contact her if she ever considered
leaving police work to teach. In July 1995, Ms. McCoy began to
reconsider President Spelling's offer and decided to call her to see
The Puerta Pacific School of Criminal Justice is part of the College, a large,
multi-campus institution founded in 1925. In 1972, the College expanded by purchasing
several smaller colleges and community colleges in the area. As part of its expansion, the
College's Board of Trustees opened the School of Criminal Justice in 1984.
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whether a position was available at the college.
In 1989, like many other colleges and universitiesthroughout the
country, the College experienced a significant downturn in applications
and student enrollment. In 1991, as the downward enrollment trend
continued, the College was forced to discontinue several degree
programs and lay off 250 members of its faculty and staff, most of
whom were in the School of Criminal Justice. Although the College has
been able to increase its hiring in recent years, the College's Board of
Trustees unanimously voted in January 1994 to institute an austerity
plan, known as the "Profit Plan," to avoid significant layoffs in the
future. Part One of the plan involved creating "Fund 2000," an
endowment fund with a goal to raise $5 million by the year 2000. So
far, the College has raised $3.7 million, $1.2 million of which is
earmarked to "attract professors. '2 Part Two of the Plan is the part in
controversy today. Part Two includes a salary structure that links years
of experience to salaries paid to newly hired professors. (A copy of this
plan is contained in the appendix to this decision.) According to the
Plan, new professors are to be hired at a point no higher than Step 2, at
which a professor with a maximum of 5 years experience in teaching or
in law enforcement and holding only a bachelor's degree is paid no more
than $28,000 per year for the first year of employment.
The College created this Profit Plan without the input of the
union, the American Union of College Professors. Founded in 1954,
AUCP has represented the faculty and staff at the College only since
August 1994, when the Union won its election by five votes. The Union
began organizing at the College at the behest of several professors who
believed that the new salary structure severely restricted hiring new,
experienced professors and unnecessarily limited the pay of older
professors. The relationship between the College and AUCP has
2 President Spelling testified that the funds will be used to endow two department
chairs and help to attract three prominent visiting professors. Although the funds may be
used to hire new associate professors, Part One of the Profit Plan was not created for that
purpose.
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generally been cordial. The collective bargaining agreement, into which
the salary structure has been incorporated with the Union's consent,
covers all faculty employed by the College, including tenured and non-
tenured professors.
After the 1991 layoffs, a number of professors left the College
to find more secure employment. Since that time, the College has found
it difficult to attract new professors. At the start of the 1995-1996
academic year, one position still remained open at the School of
Criminal Justice. The Puerta Pacific College Search Committee
advertised for the position of Assistant Professor of Criminology in the
Wagner Gazette, a local newspaper in the City of Wagner. Ms. McCoy
applied for the job and interviewedwith President Spelling. Ms. McCoy
was hired for the job at Step7, a permanent position, at a starting salary
of $53,000 per year. Ms. McCoy began teaching in September 1995. In
the interim, the search committee continued to look for a candidate to
fill the position. In October 1995, the College hired Vicki Stubing,
twenty-eight, as an Assistant Professor of Criminology. Ms. Stubing had
two years experience as a patrol officer with the Puerto Vallarta Police
Department and held a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from John
Jason College of Criminal Justice in New York City. Ms. Stubing was
hired at a salary of $27,000 per year. The College terminated Ms.
McCoy when Ms. Stubing was hired, citing Part Two of the Profit Plan.
After the College terminated Ms. McCoy, she approached Berle
Smith, her shop steward, about filing a grievance against the College.
Ms. McCoy explained that the College violated the ADEA because its
Profit Plan discriminated against teachers with experience similar to
hers, most of whom would be over forty. The Union decided to file a
grievance on behalf of Ms. McCoy, alleging discriminatory practices by
the College that violated the ADEA. Ms. McCoy also filed a charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging
that the College engaged in practices that violated the ADEA. The
EEOC conducted an investigation and declined to sue on her behalf, but
issued Ms. McCoy a right-to-sue letter.
19971 849
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DISCUSSION
Ms. McCoy alleges that Part Two of the College's Profit Plan
violates the ADEA because, she claims, it has a disparate impact on
experienced professors, many of whom are over forty. In establishing
a prima facie case of disparate impact, a plaintiff must prove that the
employment practices challenged fall more harshly on a protected class
than on a non-protectedclass. Gellerv. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1031
(2d Cir. 1980). Disparate impact theory has long been established as a
basis for liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994), which prohibits discrimination based on race,
color, sex, religion, and national origin. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). 1 find, however, that disparate impact theory
of discrimination is not applicable to the ADEA, and I deny Ms.
McCoy's demand for reinstatement and backpay.
AUCP makes several arguments in an attempt to persuade me
that the theory of disparate impact liability applies to the ADEA. First,
it argues that the virtually identical language in the ADEA and Title VII
shows that Congress intended that disparate impact claims be permitted
under the ADEA. AUCP points to language in Title VII that the
Supreme Court has interpreted to permit disparate impact claims 3 and
compares it to § 623 (a)(2) of the ADEA, which makes it unlawful for
an employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in a way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(2) (1994).
Although similarities exist between the language of the ADEA
and Title VII, these similarities do not lead to the conclusion that
disparate impact liability exists under the ADEA. The appropriate focus
should be on the correct reading of the statutory language. As some
' See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(2) (1994); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. at 428 (finding that Title Vl1's objective is to bar discriminatory employment practices,
even practices "neutral in terms of intent").
850 [Vol. XIII
WAGNER FACT PA TTERN
courts have noted, the correct reading of § 623 (a)(2) of the ADEA only
"prohibit[s] limiting, segregating, or classifying employees because of
age," and does not permit a disparate impact claim to be raised under the
statute ? See. e.g., Di Biase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719,
732 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that "the statutory language [of the ADEA]
does not explicitly provide for disparate impact liability"). This
interpretation allows only a disparate treatment claim, not a disparate
impact claim alleging intentional discrimination under the ADEA. See
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 608 (1993) (declining to
decide whether disparate impact applies to the ADEA, noting that "the
disparate treatment theory is . . . available under the ADEA as the
language of that statute makes clear"). (emphasis added).
AUCP further argues that the ADEA's legislative history proves
that Congress intended that disparate impact claims be permitted under
the ADEA, as they are under Title VII. The ADEA, AUCP asserts, was
intended to rid the workplace of all forms of discrimination against older
workers,just as Title VII was intended to eliminate discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. The Union reasons that
if Congress intended that Title VII and the ADEA accomplish the goal
ofeliminating discrimination in the workplace,then Congress must have
intended that the same causes of action be available under the ADEA
and Title VII. 5
Although this is an appealing argument, I am unwilling to
assume congressional intent regarding the ADEA and Title VII absent
evidence. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 579 (1978) (rejecting
petitioner's argument that similarities between ADEA and Title VII
demonstrates Congress's intent to denyjury trials under the ADEA"); see
also Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 608 ("[D]isparate treatment.., captures
4 Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes; Why Disparate
Impact Theory Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C.
L. REv. 267, 292 (1995).
' See Heidi Borgny Supple, Comment, Is Silence Really Golden? The Seventh
Circuit'sApplicationofDisparate Impact to the ADEA, 79 MARQ. L. REv 833, 841 (1996).
19971 851
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the essence of what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA.")
In fact, recent congressional activity shows that Congress did not
intend that disparate impact apply to the ADEA. In 1991, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994)) to reinstate
disparate impact analysis under Title VII after the Supreme Court
severely limited that analysis. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989). While Congress amended Title VII, it failed
to amend the ADEA to authorize disparate impact liability specifically.
6
If Congress had intended to allow disparate impact under the ADEA, it
probably would have done so explicitly as part of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991. Determining unarticulated legislative intent is a difficult task,
at best. See Lorillard, 424 U.S. at 585 ("We are not unmindful of the
difficulty of discerning congressional intent where the statute provides
no express answer.") Without such an intent deliberately enunciated by
Congress, I am reluctant to find that Congress intended to allow
disparate impact claims under the ADEA.
This arbitrator is also persuaded by the Supreme Court's ruling
in Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 608, that disparate impact liability does not
exist in ADEA cases. Although the Hazen Paper Court did not decide
whether disparate impact analysis applies to the ADEA, the Court
reasoned that the ADEA was enacted to prohibit inaccurate stereotyping
of the elderly, not to address all employment practices that have an
adverse impact on older workers. Id. at 609. The Court stated in Hazen
Paper that "[w]hen the employer's decision is wholly motivated by
factors other than age, the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing
stereotypes disappears. This is true even if the motivating factor is
correlated with age." Id. at 610; see also EEOC v. Francis W. Parker
Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir. 1994). Hazen Paper's rationale is
applicable in this case. Here, the College's salary structure is wholly
motivated by the College's need to manage salary costs. The Profit Plan
is structured to consider years of service, not a candidate's age. As such,
6 Pontz, suora note 4, at 302.
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Part Two of the Profit Plan does not discriminate against older
candidates. The Hazen Paper Court repeatedly stressed that "an
employee's age is analytically distinct from his years of service." 507
U.S. at 610. Accepting the Union's argument that age and years of
service are linked, therefore casting the College's salary structure as one
having a disparate impact on all older candidates, would make the
Court's rationale in Hazen Paper a nullity.
There is, therefore, ample precedent to support a finding that
disparate impact is not an appropriate claim under the ADEA, and I will
not recognize it as a viable claim in this case.
THEREFORE, IT IS THIS ARBITRATOR'S FINDING that disparate
impact is not applicable to ADEA claims. Ms. McCoy's demand for
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APPENDIX
PUERTA PACIFIC COLLEGE PROFIT PLAN - NEW HIRES
+ $2000 added for all candidates with a Masters Degree
+ $4000 added for all candidates with a Ph.D.
Step Candidate Qualifications
less than 2 years teaching experience
in a community college, technical
college, or 4-year degree-granting
institution OR
1-2 years relevant work experience
AND a Bachelor's Degree
2 2-4.5 years teaching experience
in a community college, technical
college, or 4-year degree-granting
institution OR
2-3 years relevant work experience
AND a Bachelor's Degree
3 5-7 years teaching experience at
a community college, technical
college, or a 4-year degree-granting
institution OR
3-5 years relevant work experience
AND a Bachelor's Degree
4 7-9 years teaching experience at a
community college or a 4-year
degree-granting institution OR
5-8 years relevant work experience








PUERTA PACIFIC COLLEGE PROFIT PLAN
page 2
5 9-11 years teaching experience at a
community college or a 4-year
degree-granting institution OR
8-12 years relevant work experience
AND a Bachelor's Degree
6 11-15 years teaching experience at a
community college or a 4-year degree-
granting institution OR
12-15 years relevant work experience
AND a Bachelor's Degree
7 15-22 years teaching experience
at a community college or a 4-year
degree-granting institution OR
15-25 years relevant work experience
AND a Bachelor's Degree
8 22-26 years teaching experience
at a community college or a
4-year degree-granting institution OR
25-35 years relevant work experience
AND a Bachelor's Degree
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C.C. Charo, District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Julie McCoy, brings this action under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 2, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 623 (1994) ("ADEA"). Defendant, Puerta Pacific College (the
"College"), hired Plaintiff as a professor in September 1995 but
terminated her one month later, after hiring a younger professor at a
lower salary. Plaintiff claims that Defendant's policy of refusing to hire
people above a certain salary grade has a disparate impact on older
workers. Before filing this claim, the American Union of College
Professors ("AUCP"), representing Plaintiff, filed a grievance and
submitted the dispute to arbitration. On March 14, 1996, the arbitrator
found that there was no violation of the ADEA. Meanwhile, Plaintiff
sought and received a "right-to-sue" letter from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and filed this claim shortly
thereafter. The parties agreed to a bench trial and have stipulated to the
facts contained in the Arbitration decision of March 14, 1996. 1 adopt
856 [Vol. XIII
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those facts in their entirety. With the consent of the parties, this Court,
however, has considered additional facts not addressed by the arbitrator
but which the parties submitted to the arbitrator.
JURISDICTION
Defendant asserts that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this
matter because, according to Defendant, Plaintiff agreed to submit
statutory claims to binding arbitration and has received a full and fair
hearing through the arbitral process.' As a threshold issue, therefore, I
must determine whether a union can contractually oblige employees to
binding arbitration of statutory rights disputes. The collective
bargaining agreement between the Union and the College reads, in
pertinent part:
ARTICLE 21.
2. All parties hereto shall comply with all federal, state,
and local statutes and regulations proscribing
discrimination.
(a) In addition to those forms of discrimination
addressed by said statutes and regulations, the
parties hereto expressly agree not to
discriminate, in any manner, against any person,
on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, age,
national origin, physical or mental handicap, or
sexual orientation.
' Defendant presented its defense by a motion under rule 12 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. In the interests of judicial economy, the parties and I agreed that I
would decide Defendant'smotion, together with the ADEA issue, in my decision following
the bench trial.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
ARTICLE 47.
1. All disputes not settled pursuant to any grievance
procedure provided for herein shall, at the request of
either party, be referred to final and binding arbitration.
2. The parties expressly agree that the arbitrator shall have
jurisdiction to decide any claims that a party has
violated any federal, state or local anti-discrimination
statute, including, without limitation, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans
with Disabilities Act.
3. The arbitrator's decision, in all disputes submitted to
arbitration, shall be final and binding upon both parties
as to all issues.
The initial question this Court must decide is whether Plaintiff s
age discrimination claim falls within the ambit of these contractual
provisions. Article 21, § 2, requires that Defendant follow federal laws
against discrimination, including the ADEA, a federal anti-
discrimination statute. Moreover, subparagraph (a) specifically
proscribes age discrimination. Thus, pursuant to Article 21, the contract
governs Defendant's alleged misconduct. Article 47 provides the
grievance procedures available. Section 1 permits Plaintiffs union, with
Defendant's approval, to submit disputes to arbitration. Section 2
provides that statutory rights, such as those Ms. McCoy asserts, are
appropriate for arbitration. Finally, § 3 provides that once parties submit
disputes to arbitration, the arbitration decisions are final and binding
upon both parties.
The arbitrator's decision of the age discrimination dispute
between Plaintiffand Defendant is thus binding if these provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement between Defendant and Plaintiffs union
are enforceable. Plaintiff argues that this agreement is unenforceable,
however, because unions cannot waive the rights of bargaining unit
858 [Vol. XlII
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members to bring an action in court under anti-discrimination statutes
like the ADEA. I agree.
The Supreme Court has held that unions cannot, through a
collective bargaining agreement, waive the rights of individual
employees to bring discrimination claims in court. See Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver 415 U.S. 36, 59 (1974). In Gardner-Denver the
Supreme Court permitted the claimant to pursue in court a race
discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994), even though an arbitrator, acting pursuant to
a collective bargaining agreement, previously determined that the
plaintiff was not the victim of race discrimination. See 415 U.S. at 42.
The Court held that "an individual does not forfeit his private cause of
action if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under the
nondiscrimination clause of a collective bargaining agreement." Id. at
49. Moreover, the Court held that there was "no suggestion in the
statutory scheme [of Title VII] that a prior arbitral decision either
forecloses an individual's right to sue or divests federal courts of
jurisdiction." Id. at 47.
The Court further based its decision in Gardner-Denver on clear
legislative intent. The Court determined that Congress had long
demonstrated an intent to "accord parallel or overlapping remedies
against discrimination." Id. (citing the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1994); Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1994)). Furthermore, the Court held that Congress did not intend
arbitration to be the only forum for Title VII claims. See 415 U.S. at 48.
Although Plaintiff asserts an ADEA claim, rather than a Title VII claim,
given the similarity between the statutes2 I find no basis for holding that
2 The pertinent sections of the ADEA and Title VII, respectively, read as follows:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer-( 1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to
19971 859
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Congress intended a different result under the ADEA than it did Under
Title VII.
The Court reiterated the holding of Gardner-Denver in
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.. Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 737
(1981). In Barrentine the Court considered a minimum-wage dispute
between an employer and employee covered by a collective bargaining
agreement. Id. at 730-31. The parties had submitted the dispute to
arbitration, and the relevant collective bargaining agreement rendered
all arbitration decisions final and binding. Id. at 731. The Court,
however, refused to recognize the final and binding provision of the
collective bargaining agreement and noted that "[n]ot all disputes
between an employee and his employer are suited for binding resolution
in accordance with the procedures established by collective bargaining
agreements." Id. at 737.
The majority of the courts that have considered the issue have
also determined that collective bargaining agreements cannot require
binding arbitration of statutory rights. In Bolden v. SEPTA, 953 F.2d
807, 811 (3d Cir. 1991), for example, the Court considered a claim by
an employee who was terminated following a drug test that, although
permissible under the collective bargaining agreement, the court
determined was unconstitutional. The collective bargaining agreement
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994)
(a) Employer practices
It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's age.
29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994).
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provided for submitting the employee's discriminatory discharge claim
to binding arbitration. Id. However, the court held that the union had
no right to make agreements with the employer to arbitrate issues of the
employee's statutory or constitutional rights. Id. In Sewell v. New York
City Transit Auth., 809 F. Supp. 208, 211-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1992),
moreover, the employee brought claims under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), and Title VII against the New York City
Transit Authority for retaliatory, discriminatory discharge. The district
court, relying on Gardner-Denve held that it would be unfair to permit
binding arbitration in the collective bargaining context because "union
representation before an arbitrator may conflict with the interests of an
individual plaintiff." Id. at 215-16.
Defendant asserts, however, that the Supreme Court's more
recent decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 500 U.S. 20
(1991), has overturned Gardner-Denver. The Gilmer Court held that an
employee who was obligated by agreement to arbitrate a statutory
discrimination claim was precluded from bringing an ADEA claim in
court. See id. at 35. In Gilmer, however, unlike Gardner-Denver, the
arbitration pledge was contained in an individual contract rather than in
a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 23.
The distinction between individual employment contracts and
collective bargaining agreements is significant because unions, by
nature, seek contract terms that would benefit the majority of the
members of the bargainingunit. See Women, Labor Unions, and Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment: The Untold Story. 4 TEX. J. WOMEN
& L. 9, 11 (1995). 3 It is thus conceivable that unions would agree to
arbitration provisions in exchange for management concessions that
would benefit the majority of members at the expense of minority
' The distinctionsbetween Gilmer and Gardner-Denverhave also been recognized
by the majority of courts that have considered this issue. See. e.g.. Crawford v. West Jersey
Health System 847 F. Supp. 1232, 1241 (D.N.J. 1994); Hull v. NCR Corp. 826 F. Supp.
303, 305 (E.D. Mo. 1993); DeCrisci v. Lyndon Guar. Bank of N.Y., 807 F. Supp. 947, 951
(W.D.N.Y. 1992); Dancu v. Coopers & Lybrand, 778 F. Supp. 832, 833 (E.D.P.A. 1991),
affd mem., 972 F.2d 1330 (3d Cir. 1992).
19971 861
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members.4 Unfortunately, it is generally those of minority status who
are discriminated against in the workplace. Id. Because the ADEA was
enacted to protect individuals from discrimination by majorities, the
protection afforded by the ADEA is especially important in the
collective bargaining context, and individuals must be able to litigate
their claims. More important, in this case, the union had complete
control over the arbitration process. Ms. McCoy could not bring her
claim to arbitration without the union's consent, and under the collective
bargaining agreement she was not entitled to represent herself at the
hearing.
Finally, Defendant argues that disallowing binding arbitration of
statutory rights under collective bargaining agreements would thwart the
intent behind the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
Congress passed the FAA in 1925 to decrease the incessant backlog of
cases to be adjudicated and to make courts more tolerant of arbitration
as an alternative means of dispute resolution. See Asplundh Tree
Expert Co.v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 597 (6th Cir. 1995). Under the FAA,
contracts that govern commercial transactions may include requirements
to settle disputes arising therefrom by submitting the disputes to
irrevocable, enforceable arbitration. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406-07 (1967). In Gilmer, the
Supreme Court never reached the question of the FAA's applicability to
employment contracts; the petitioner in Gilmer never raised the issue,
and the contract at issue in Gilmer was a securities registration
agreement rather than a contract of employment. 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
4 Unions often make wage and benefit matters a priority in negotiations. See.
e.g., Thomas J. Campbell, The National Labor Relations Act After 50 Years, 38 STAN. L.
REv. 991, 1006 (1986).
The hostility toward arbitration that existed in English common law was
adopted by American courts and was predicated on the theory that only judges could render
justice. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corn., 500 U.S. at 24 (1991).
6 Section I of the FAA reads as follows:
§ I ['C]ommerce', as herein defined, means commerce among the
862 [Vol. XIII
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This Court finds, however, that Congress did not intend the FAA to
apply to employment contracts.
Although the Supreme Court did not answer the FAA
employment contract question in Gilmer, Justice Stevens did so in his
dissent. See 500 U.S. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Citing to the
drafters of the FAA, Justice Stevens argued that "the bill is not intended
[to] be an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to give
the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing
with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it." Id.
(quoting chairman of American Bar Association committee responsible
for drafting bill before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Judiciary,
67th Cong., 4th Sess., 9 (1923)). On the basis of this legislative intent,
Justice Stevens concluded, as do I, that the FAA specifically excluded
agreements between employees and employers. See 500 U.S. at 40
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
Thus, the FAA does not apply to employment contracts.
Furthermore, there is an irreconcilable tension between the interests of
collective bargaining units and the interests of its minority members.
That tension renders binding arbitration agreements unfair in the
collective-bargainingcontext. Because precious individual rights are at
stake, this Court prefers to err, if at all, on the side of caution. I
therefore find that Plaintiff is not procedurally barred from bringing this
action. I will now consider the merits.
several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United
States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and
another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation,
or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or
foreign nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (emphasis added).
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ADEA CLAIM
Ms. Julie McCoy alleges that Part Two of the College's Profit
Plan constitutes an unlawful employment practice under the ADEA.
Specifically, Ms. McCoy alleges that Part Two of the College's Profit
Plan violates the ADEA because the Plan has a disparate impact on older
professors. The issue was brought before an arbitrator in compliance
with the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the
College. The arbitrator found that disparate impact claims are not
cognizable under the ADEA and denied Ms. McCoy's claim on the
merits. I find that disparate impact is a viable legal theory under the
ADEA, but I deny Ms. McCoy's claim on the merits because the College
has demonstrated business necessity as a defense for its Profit Plan.
DISPARATE IMPA CTAND THE ADEA
Plaintiff offers several compelling arguments that convince this
Court that disparate impact liability applies to the ADEA. First, Plaintiff
argues that the ADEA was modeled in large part on Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1994), and that this
evidences Congress's intent that disparate-impact liability applies to the
ADEA. I agree. In drafting the ADEA, Congress borrowed statutory
language in large measure from Title VII. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (noting that "the prohibitions of the ADEA were
derived in haec verba from Title VII"). The similarities in language
between the two statutes are particularly evident when one compares §
2000e-2 (a)(2) of Title VII, which allows disparate impact claims,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428 (1971), with § 623(a)(2)
of the ADEA. See also EEOC v. Governor Mifflin Sch. Dist., 623 F.
Supp. 734, 740 (E.D. Pa. 1985) ("[T]he starting point [to interpretingthe
ADEA] must be the statute itself. In this case, the statute is the same as
Title VII.").
Furthermore, as Plaintiff argues in her brief, both Title VII and
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the ADEA share the same goal of eradicating discrimination in the
workplace, and as such, causes of action available under the Title VII
should also be available under the ADEA. In Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
at 583, the Supreme Court noted that there are "important similarities
between [Title VII and the ADEA]," particularly the statutes' purposes
in eliminatingdiscriminationin the workplace. 434 U.S. at 583. Since
it is well established that disparate impact claims may be brought under
Title VII, see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428, this Court finds it logical that
disparate impact also applies to ADEA claims.
I am most persuaded, however, by the Second Circuit's holding
in Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1980), in which the
Court applied a disparate impact analysis to the ADEA to find that a
defendant school district's hiring practices had a discriminatory impact
on older workers. In Geller, the court found that plaintiff had produced
sufficient statistical evidence to prove that the school district's salary
scale and hiring practices had a discriminatory impact on older teachers.
See id. at 1034.
In addition, I am guided by the fact that several other circuits
have already held that disparate impact may apply to ADEA claims. See
Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 690 (8th Cir.
1983) (finding that defendant's faculty selection system had disparate
impact on older faculty members); Governor Mifflin Sch. Dist., 623 F.
Supp. at 741 (holding that disparate impact applies to ADEA). For these
reasons, I find that disparate impact theory applies to the ADEA.
THE PROFITPLANASAN UNLA WFUL
EMPLOYMENTPRACTICE
(i) Establishing a Prima Facie Case Under the ADEA
Even though disparate impact claims are cognizable under the
ADEA, Ms. McCoy must still show that the College's Profit Plan is an
unlawful employment practice. To establish a prima facie case of
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disparate impact, Ms. McCoy must demonstrate that the College's Profit
Plan has a disparate impact on older professors. A plaintiff may
establish disparate impact by presenting statistics that show that a
facially neutral employment practice has a discriminatory effect on a
protected class. Geller, 635 F.2d at 1033. Ms. McCoy has shown that
Part Two of the College's Profit Plan has a disparate impact on older
professors. She presented to the arbitrator, and I rely on this evidence,
by a credible statistical expert, Dr. Adam Bricker, whose data shows that
87.4% of all college professors in the State of Wagner between the ages
of forty and fifty-five have more than ten years experience and are paid
more than $40,000 per year, while only 23% of all college professors
between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-nine have more than ten years
experience and only 13.9% are paid more than 40,000 per year.
Accordingly, Ms. McCoy has established a prima facie case under a
disparate impact theory. This is not enough, however, to show that the
College's Profit Plan is an unlawful employment practice. Defendant
can still prevail if it can demonstrate that the employment practice is job
related and consistent with business necessity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
§ 105 (k)(1)(A) (1994).
(ii) Business Necessity and Disparate Impact
Once a plaintiff shows that an employment practice has a
disparate impact, which Ms. McCoy has done in this case, the burden
then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the practice is supported
by business necessity. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overruled portions
of the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989), which held that the burden falls on
the plaintiff to persuade a court that business necessity exists. Section
105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 reinstates the burden first articulated
in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,327 (1977), which requires that
the employer bear the burden of persuasion to demonstrate that the




I find that the College has demonstrated a business necessity for
its Plan. First, the College's asserted business purpose for the Profit
Plan, to manage its budget better so that it may avoid the layoffs made
necessary in 1991, is essential to the economic survival of the College.
In 1991, the College had to close several campuses permanently and lay
off over 250 personnel, most of whom were non-tenured professors, in
order to stave off further financial hardship. The College continues to
feel the effects of the layoffs, reflected mostly by its inability to attract
a sufficient number of professors to teach classes at the School of
Criminal Justice. One of the primary ways that the College can
guarantee betterjob security to potential professors is to better manage
the salaries paid to new professors. See Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc.
912 F.2d 867, 875 (6th Cir. 1990) (observing that "minimizing the cost
of labor is a legitimate business consideration"). The Profit Plan
appropriately serves the purpose of minimizing labor costs to secure the
financial stability of the business entity as a whole. Faced with the
possibility of experiencing more campus closures if its financial
circumstances are not tightly controlled, the College has demonstrated
a business necessity sufficient to overcome any discriminatory impact
that the Profit Plan may have on older professors.
Furthermore, the College argues that its primary business
purpose in creating and implementingthe Profit Plan is to bring financial
stability to the College, to manage hiring new faculty and staff better,
and to make more academic programs available to its students. Since
the establishment of the Profit Plan in 1991, the College has made
headway in accomplishing its goals. The College has been able to hire
ten new assistant professors throughout the College system, offer five
new courses at the School of Criminal Justice, and reinstate a previously
closed degree program in art history. The College has made credible
business decisions to maintain its financial health. Decisions such as
these are best left to the businesses themselves. See Ackerman v.
Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 70 (6th Cir. 1982) (affirming
district court's ruling that employer had legitimate business reasons to
eliminate employee's job, although employee was over forty years old,
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noting that "[t]he ADEA was not intended as a vehicle for judicial
review of business decisions"). The College has demonstrated that the
Profit Plan furthers its goal of maintaining the College's financial
stability.
The College has tried a number of other unsuccessful options to
raise money and to hire new professors. Fundraising drives, private
donations, and past efforts at endowments have met with only moderate
success. Part Two of the Profit Plan has allowed the College to enjoy
the most expansion and the best fiscal health since it opened the School
of Criminal Justice in 1972.
Therefore, I find that the College has met its burden of business
necessity in this case.
THEREFORE, IT IS THIS COURT'S FINDING that Plaintiff is
not procedurally barred from bringing this action. Furthermore,
although disparate impact is applicable to ADEA claims, Puerta Pacific
College has demonstrated business necessity for Part Two of its Profit
Plan.
Judgment is entered for the College. Ms. McCoy's demand for backpay
and reinstatement are hereby denied.




WA GNER FACT PA TTERN
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS










Before M. Rork, T. DePlaine, and P. Princess, Circuit Judges
Tatoo DePlaine, Circuit Judge:
Introduction
Plaintiff-Appellant ("Appellant"), Julie McCoy, asserts that
Defendant-Appellee("Appellee"), Puerta Pacific College, discriminated
against her within the meaning of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994). The
employer/employeerelationship between the parties was governed by a
collective bargaining agreement entered into between the Appellee and
the Appellant's union, the American Union of College Professors, Local
522 ("AUCP"). The agreement contains a provision that forbids
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discrimination, including statutorily proscribed discrimination.1 The
ADEA proscribes age discrimination.2 Thus, Appellant's claim falls
within the purview of the collective bargaining agreement. The
agreement further provides that, at the request of either party, disputes
such as Appellant's shall be submitted to arbitration, the result of which
would be final and binding.3 AUCP and the Appellee agreed to submit
the Appellant's claim to arbitration pursuant thereto, and the arbitrator
decided in Appellee's favor. Thereafter, Appellant brought suit under
the ADEA in the District Court for the District of Wagner. The district
court held that Appellant was not precluded from bringing a civil suit
subsequentto arbitration but that Appellee had not discriminated against
Appellant within the meaning of the ADEA. The parties filed cross-
appeals with this Court. Appellant asserts that the district court erred in
finding for Appellee on the discrimination issue. Appellee asserts that
the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter, given the
language of the collective bargaining agreement. Because we agree with
Appellee that the district court lacked jurisdiction, we need not consider
the merits of Appellant's ADEA claim.
Discussion
The issue before this Court is whether a union can require
The relevant portion of the collective bargaining agreement reads: "2. All
parties hereto shall comply with all federal, state, and local statutes and regulations
proscribing discrimination."
2 The ADEA provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees in a way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(2) (1994).
' The relevant portions of the provision read: "1. All disputes not settled
pursuant to any grievance procedure provided for herein shall, at the request of either party,
be referred to final and binding arbitration. . . . 3. The arbitrator's decision, in all disputes
submitted to arbitration, shall be final and binding on both parties as to all issues." (From
Article 47 of the collective bargaining agreement).
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employees to submit statutory discrimination claims to binding
arbitration. This is a case of first impression in this Court, and the
Supreme Court has never decided the issue. However, the claim in
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991),, was
similar enough to the claim in this case to provide us with guidance.
Application of Gilmer
In Gilmer, a financial services manager brought an age
discrimination claim under the ADEA. See 500 U.S. at 23. As a
condition of his employment, the claimant had signed a broker's
registration agreement with the New York Stock Exchange. Id. This
agreement contained an arbitration clause that required him to submit
statutory discrimination claims to arbitration. Id. The claimant
bypassed this requirement, however, bringing suit in federal court
instead. Id. He asserted that arbitral fora are inappropriate for resolving
statutory rights disputes. Id. The Supreme Court rejected his argument,
recognizing that "it is by now clear that statutory claims may be the
subject of an arbitration agreement." Id. at 26.
Likewise, in the case at bar, Appellant brought an ADEA claim
in federal court, asserting that arbitration was an inappropriate vehicle
to adjudicate her statutory claim. Her claim must similarly be rejected.
Appellant argues in her brief that Gilmer is inapplicable to her
case because Gilmer involved a broker's registration agreement, not an
employment contract, and because a union did not negotiate the
arbitration agreement in Gilmer. Neither of these distinctions, however,
is sufficient to render Gilmer inapplicable.
A. Contractual Analysis
We do not subscribe to Appellant's theory that the registration
agreement in Gilmer is meaningfully distinguishable from the collective
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bargaining agreement at issue here. The Court in Gilmer stressed that
entering into the registration agreement was a prerequisite to the
claimant's employment. See 500 U.S. at 23. The Court further noted
that the registration agreement functioned as an employment contract to
the extent that it governed "[a]ny controversy between a registered
representative and any member or member organization arising out of
the employment or termination of employment of such registered
representative." Id. Both of these conditions serve to blur any
distinction between the contracts at issue.
Moreover, Appellant's argument is inconsistent with the
language and intent of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§
1-16 (1994). The FAA "requires courts to enforce privately negotiated
agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their
terms." Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989).
Notwithstanding Justice Steven's dissent in Gilmer, 500 U.S. at
39, and the district court's reliance on it, the FAA does not exclude all
employment contracts from its coverage. See 9 U.S.C. § 1. Rather, as
the majority of courts have held, the employment contract exceptions to
the FAA are narrow, including only those of seamen, railroad
employees, and those involved in interstate commerce. See, e.g., Pietro
Scalzitti Constr. Co. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs., Local
No. 150, 351 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1965) (holding that interstate commerce
includes bus and truck drivers); DeCrisci v. Lyndon Guar. Bank of N.Y.,
807 F. Supp. 947 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that Congress did not intend
FAA to exclude all employment contracts).
Appellant's employment with Appellee was neither as a
seaperson or railroad employee, nor could the activities of her
employment be described as involving interstate commerce in any way.
The FAA is thus applicable to Appellant's employment contract.
We further base our decision to apply the FAA in cases such as
the one before us on the strong policy reasons behind the Act. Congress
enacted the FAA in 1923 in part to serve the vital function of decreasing
the backlog in the courts. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
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506, 511 (1974). We are concerned that, despite the positive effects of
the FAA, namely the trend toward arbitration, the caseload of statutory
disputes arising in the workplace is still increasing. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, for example, is presently facing
a backlog of more than 100,000 employment discrimination claims. In
Support of Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes
NYSBA Labor and Employment Law Section Newsletter (NYSBA/
Evan J. Spelfogel), June 1996, Vol. 21, No. 2. Moreover, new cases are
coming in at a rate twenty percent higher than last year. Id. Finally,
over 25,000 discriminatory discharge cases are pending in the federal
courts. Id. This trend cannot be permitted to continue. Courts simply
cannot handle the volume. Thus, because arbitration has proven to be
a useful and meaningful surrogate for the court system, our court is
anxious to expand, not contract, the use of arbitration. This includes
allowing binding arbitration under employment contracts.
B. Individual Employment Contracts versus
Collective Bargaining Agreements
Appellant also asserts that Gilmer is inapplicable to this case
because the claimant in Gilmer individually entered into an arbitration
agreement. See 500 U.S. at 23. In contrast, the arbitration clause at
issue here was negotiated by the AUCP as part of a collective bargaining
agreement. Appellant's brief suggests several problems unique to
collective bargaining agreements. First, Appellant contends that
arbitration unfairly favors employers. However, as the Supreme Court
held in Gilmer, "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power . . . is not a
sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never
enforceable in the employment context." 500 U.S. at 33. Appellantalso
expresses concern that an individual's interests may be subordinated to
those of the collective bargaining unit. In fact, the Supreme Court did
voice these concerns in both Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35, and Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974). However, merely
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because the Court expressed concern does not indicate that it intended
to foreclose the debate. We find that, although valid, these concerns are
counter-balancedby existing safeguards. The Supreme Court has held,
for example, that unions have an implied statutory obligation to
represent each employee fairly. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177
(1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953); Steele
v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944). The Court has
also held that the duty of fair representation applies not only to a union's
contract administration but to negotiation tactics as well. Air Line Pilots
Ass'n Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 77 (1991). We therefore find that the
interests of employees under collective bargaining agreements are
sufficiently protected and will not be jeopardized by permitting unions
to contract for binding arbitration of statutory rights.
In reaching our decision, we note that several courts have
reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Bolden v. SEPTA, 953 F.2d
807, 825 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that arbitrating § 1983 claim under
collective bargaining agreement does not preclude later litigation);
Rosen v. Transx Ltd., 816 F. Supp. 1364 (D. Minn. 1993); Sewell v.
New York City Transit Auth., 809 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). These
cases are distinguishable, however, from the case at bar because the
collective bargaining agreement at issue in each case did not expressly
include the arbitration of statutory rights disputes. See Bolden, 953 F.2d
at 825; Rosen, 816 F. Supp. at 1366-67; Sewell, 809 F. Supp. at 214. In
contrast to those cases, the collective bargaining agreement between
Appellant and Appellee expressly includes statutory rights disputes as
qualified for binding arbitration.
We consider the Fourth Circuit's analysis more relevant and
more persuasive than that of the aforementioned cases. See Austin v.
Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996). In
Austin, a discharged employee brought an action under the Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12202
(1994), against her former employer. See 78 F.3d at 885. As in this
case, the collective bargaining agreement between Owens-Brockway
and the union in that case specifically allowed for binding arbitration of
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statutory claims. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that such a requirement in
the collective bargaining agreement was permissible, reasoning that,
because "unions may waive the right to strike and other rights," there is
no reason to hold that they cannot similarly waive statutory rights. Id.
at 885.
Furthermore, there is no legal foundation for Appellant's
assertion that collective bargaining agreements differ in any meaningful
way from individual agreements. To the contrary, we believe it likely
that employees receive more protection when binding arbitration clauses
are negotiated by experienced, knowledgeable union representatives
than when employees negotiate contracts individually. Indeed, it is the
skill and knowledge of union negotiators that levels the playing field
during labor negotiations. It would thus be illogical to assume that an
individual can negotiate a more protective contract than a union can.
Applicability of Gardner-Denver
Rather than relying on Gilmer, the court below improperly relied
on Gardner-Denver. This case is quite distinguishable from Gardner-
Denver, however, because the arbitration clause there did not include
statutory rights as the arbitration clause does here. See 415 U.S. at 39-
40.
As the Court noted in Gardner-Denver, the arbitrator who
initially heard the claimant's race discrimination claim had the authority
to resolve only contractual questions. 415 U.S. at 37. Because the
collective bargaining agreement in that case did not include the
arbitration of statutory rights, the arbitrator's decision was based solely
on contractually defined discrimination. Id. The Court held that the
claimant, "in instituting an action under Title VII, [was] not asserting a
statutory right independent of the arbitration process." Id. at 54. The
holding of Gardner-Denver is thus inapplicable to this case because
implicit in the Court's holding is the concept that had the contract called
for statutory rights arbitration, the determination of rights thereunder
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would have been within the arbitrator's authority.
Conclusion
Gilmer provides the appropriate precedent for us to follow.
Under the dictates of Gilmer, binding arbitration of Appellant's ADEA
claim was appropriate. As such, the district court did not have
jurisdiction to try the matter. Moreover, we reaffirm our intention to
adhere strictly to the FAA in all cases other than those specifically
precluded by Congress. Appellant's claim is dismissed without opinion
as to the disparate impact issue that Appellant raises.
Dismissed.
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The petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit to review the decision in McCoy v.
Puerta Pacific College, 600 F.3d 322 (13th Cir. 1996), is granted to
review the following questions:
I. Is a union's agreement, as part of a collective bargaining
agreement that requires bargaining unit members to submit
statutory rights disputes to binding arbitration, enforceable?
2. Should disparate impact liability be recognized under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994),
and, if so, has Respondent succeeded in establishing business
necessity?
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